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Some Animals Are More Equal than Others: 
The Rehnquist Court and “Majority Religion” 
Garrett Epps* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970s, a radical theater company in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, created a play called “How to Make a Woman” 
dramatizing the difficulties women face in a patriarchal culture. After 
each performance, members of the audience would remain for a 
consciousness—raising session with the cast. At one of those 
sessions, as I recall, a plainly flustered male audience member asked, 
“Do women really want total equality with men?” A female voice 
from the audience responded, “Hell, no! We’d be stupid to settle for a 
crummy deal like that!” 
One commentator has famously called equality an “empty idea,”1 
but, as a concept, equality is in fact not empty at all, but instead 
dangerously overfull. To those who believe they are looking upward 
on the ladder of hierarchy, equality seems a golden vision, like 
Jacob’s angels ascending to heaven; but when those same people look 
back down at those below them, the ladder takes on a threatening, 
hellish cast. As the old saying goes: “Everyone wants to go to 
Heaven, but nobody wants to die.” Similarly, everyone wants to rise 
to equality, but no one wants to descend to it, even in small things.  
The exchange also illustrates that every insurgent movement finds 
itself torn between two demands. On the one hand, it may request 
 
 * Orlando John and Marian H. Hollis Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. I 
would like to thank Professor Neil Richards and the editors of the Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy for their invitation to participate in their symposium. Other members 
of the Washington University faculty were also helpful and inspiring. Thanks also to Professors 
William Van Alstyne, Ann Hubbard and Robert Tsai, who reviewed a draft. Jessica Freeman 
provided research assistance. 
 1. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
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equality for its members—the simple opportunity to fit into the 
existing order of society. On the other hand, it may ask for 
transformation—social change so pervasive that the very question of 
equality will cease to be meaningful. Thus, the Civil Rights 
Movement at its height did not simply demand an end to 
discrimination in employment, housing, education and other existing 
areas; “it also envisioned a ‘beloved community,”2 defined as a 
‘social order defined by justice infused by love.’”3 In this new world, 
the divisions between the haves and the have-nots would be 
reconciled by an overarching vision of justice and brotherhood. So, 
too, the feminist movement of the 1960s and 70s imagined a world in 
which existing gender categories would disappear, and women would 
not seek equality with men because the idea of a male norm would 
become meaningless. 
These reflections are sparked by the remarkable change that the 
Rehnquist Court has made in the law of religious freedom in the 
United States. Even for a Court that moved the Constitution radically 
towards the right over the last two decades, the degree and direction 
of the shift in the law of church and state is not just striking, but 
almost vertiginous. The Court narrowed the Free Exercise Clause;4 
changed the test for Establishment Clause violations;5 and permitted, 
for the first time in modern memory, the expenditure of tax funds for 
individual tuition at religious schools.6 Many who have surveyed the 
final term of the Court have noted that the doctrinal result is unstable, 
and portends a revolution that not only has not yet ended, but may not 
yet even have truly begun. My purpose here is to show the scope of 
the change the Court has wrought in the discourse of religion and the 
 
 2. The “beloved community” is identified with the social thought of Martin Luther King 
Jr.. King once wrote “[o]ur ultimate goal is integration which is genuine intergroup and 
interpersonal living. Only through nonviolence can this goal be attained, for the aftermath of 
nonviolence is reconcialiation and the creation of the beloved community.” MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM (1958), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL 
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 417, 487 (1988). 
 3. This definition is of the “redemptive community.” Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee, http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/about_king/encyclopedia/enc_SNCC.htm 
(Oct. 25, 2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 5. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 6. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/13
p323 Epps book pages.DOC  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Some Animals Are More Equal 325 
 
 
Constitution. Warren- and Burger-era concepts such as “neutrality,” 
“substantial burden,” or “accommodation” no longer address the 
schema the Court has created for regulating religion’s public role. 
Instead, the Court has used the ambiguous idea of equality to create a 
remarkable shift—one that is not even remotely tied to the text or 
history of the Religion Clauses. Though the shift relies on dribs and 
drabs of judicial rhetoric in earlier cases, it is resolutely scornful of 
precedent. It is not an evolution, or a refinement, or a correction. It is, 
or aspires to be, transformative: it is something brand new. 
Early in the Rehnquist years, Justices favoring greater 
involvement of state and religion proclaimed the necessity of ending 
the oppression of religion. This oppression was of a particular kind—
not oppression of religious minorities (which the Court indulgently 
suggested is to be expected), but oppression of the religious majority 
by the minority forces of secularism. At the Court’s mid-point, a 
majority of Justices proclaimed that the year of Jubilee had come, and 
that religion would henceforth be treated equally, even when equal 
treatment seemed to entail violating core values of the Religion 
Clauses.7 In the Court’s final term, the same prophetic voice that first 
demanded freedom from oppression now announced that, properly 
understood, the Constitution does not require equality at all, but a 
favored place, at the right hand of Caesar, for certain “traditional” 
American faiths, even if the result is state oppression, or at least 
conscious disregard, of religious minorities.8 The result promises to 
favor any religious group numerous and powerful enough to make 
itself heard at the polls, and in essence relegates “discrete and 
insular” religious minorities to the kindly care, or neglect, of the 
majority. When majority religions have the opportunity to obtain 
government subsidy in particular, they may not be denied it on the 
plea that the Establishment Clause forbids this—for that would not be 
treating them equally. The argument that religion is special cannot 
operate to restrict the speech or practice of a majority. But when 
religious minorities find themselves excluded from the famously 
disputed public square, that exclusion may be permissible because 
religion, or at least some religion, is, after all, special. Not special in 
 
 7. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 8. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the traditional understanding of enduring special restraints in 
exchange for robust constitutional protection, but rather special in the 
sense that American history and tradition require that government 
and the courts favor a particular religious tradition or traditions. That 
tradition or those traditions are never to be treated as less than equal; 
but they may, and should, be treated as more than equal. To 
paraphrase George Orwell, the new doctrine is pregnant with the idea 
that in the noisy, colorful Noah’s Ark of American religious tradition, 
“[a]ll animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than 
others.”9 
This Article explores the evolution of this remarkable new view of 
religion and the Constitution during the Rehnquist Court era. Part II 
analyzes Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lee v. Weisman,10 which set out 
the agenda for the religious caucus of the Court in the early years. 
Part III shows how the rhetoric of equality and historical grievance 
has been used to dismantle the boundary—for old time’s sake, let us 
call it a “wall of separation”—that separated religious institutions 
from the public fisc. Part IV analyzes Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union.11 In that 
dissent, as he did in Lee v. Weisman,12 Justice Scalia seemed to draw 
a battle map of how his troops would storm the next walled city of 
separation. The Conclusion suggests what the territory may look like 
if the pro-”traditional religion” forces achieve all their objectives. It 
is, I argue, not a pretty prospect, and it is pregnant with precisely the 
malign possibilities that led the Framers to include the oracular but 
powerful Religion Clauses in the Bill of Rights.13 
II. RELIGION AS PORNOGRAPHY 
The First Amendment contains no overarching language 
enunciating a goal of “religious freedom” or “separation of church 
and state.” Instead, it protects religious freedom through two clauses, 
 
 9. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 92 (Centennial ed. 2003). 
 10. 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 11. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12. See supra note 10. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
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the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.14 Neither 
clause is perspicuous in meaning, and together they form a net of 
ambiguity—what to one observer may seem like a protection for “the 
free exercise of religion” may seem to another like a “special 
privilege” granted to religion, and thus an “establishment of religion” 
by law. Scholars and judges have struggled, and uniformly failed, to 
bring the two clauses into stable harmonic alignment.15 Until 
recently, perhaps the only thing that could be said with some 
confidence was that both clauses implied some restraint on majority 
rule in matters of religion and the state. The majority could not by 
vote strip religious minorities of their free exercise rights; nor could it 
use its numerical predominance to proclaim itself the official religion 
of the United States or, under the Fourteenth Amendment, of any 
particular state. 
This anti-majoritarian character is now in question for both 
clauses. The Rehnquist Court’s first major foray into the area of 
religion and the Constitution was its unsettling and radical decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith,16 in which a majority held that states 
could burden, or even outlaw entirely, the free exercise of minority 
faiths so long as the legal burden on that free exercise arose from a 
neutral, generally applicable law and not from active conscious 
hostility.17 If that meant that minority religions could be burdened or 
even banned, that was just too bad for them. As Justice Scalia 
explained: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the 
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those 
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be 
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto 
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all 
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.18 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 563 (1998) (discussing scholars’ confusions among the two clauses). 
 16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 17. Id. at 878–82. 
 18. Id. at 890. 
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Arguably, Smith represents the flood tide of Justice Scalia’s 
influence over the other Justices. The record in Smith shows clearly 
that Justice Scalia was the Court-maker in the long history of the 
case,19 and that he led the majority down a path that he designed. 
That path has been sharply criticized by scholarly commentators for 
its wholesale revision of precedent and dismissive attitude toward 
minority rights.20 The shocking opinion in Smith got the Court in 
trouble both with Congress and with organized religion, and has led 
to an elaborate process of attempted legislative overruling and 
judicial narrowing in an evident attempt to draw the sting of the 
opinion’s full-throated majoritarianism.21 
In the Establishment Clause context, Smith suggested that a 
majority of the Court might be disposed to ease the burden on a local 
religious majority that wanted to include lightly concealed prayers of 
its faith in official governmental exercises. During the waning years 
of the Burger Court, members of the Court had begun to express 
discomfort with the three-part test for Establishment Clause 
violations established in Lemon v. Kurtzman.22 Under the Lemon test, 
government action required both a secular purpose and a primary 
effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion to be valid.23 It was 
difficult, though not impossible, to argue that officially led or 
sanctioned public prayer had either. So, two new tests were offered in 
Lemon’s place—Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” test and Justice 
Kennedy’s “coercion” test.24 Under the former, a government action 
 
 19. See GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL (1st ed. 
2001) (documenting Justice Scalia’s memoranda shaping the question presented in the final 
Smith opinion). 
 20. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division 
v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 956 n.11 (1998) (collecting hostile scholarly commentary). On 
Justice Scalia’s use of precedent in Smith, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise 
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1990) (calling use of 
precedent “shocking”); see also EPPS, supra note 19, at 217 (opining that a first-year law student 
who interpreted cases as Justice Scalia did in the Smith opinion would receive a failing grade); 
Garrett Epps, “You Have Been in Afghanistan”: A Discourse on the Van Alstyne Method, 54 
DUKE L.J. 1555 (2005) (calling Justice Scalia’s published strictures against judges who 
manipulate precedent a “cry for help—Stop me before I distinguish more”). 
 21. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, The Wrong Vampire, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 455 (1999) 
(documenting Congressional attempts at overriding Smith). 
 22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 23. Id. at 612. 
 24. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
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was invalid if, by endorsing religion in general or a particular 
religion, it sent “a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, 
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.”25 Under the latter, a government action, even 
one endorsing religion, was valid so long as non-believers were not 
“coerced” to engage in religious speech or behavior contrary to their 
consciences.26 Justice Kennedy proposed this standard in dissent in 
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, a crèche-
display case,27 and it was endorsed by an influential commentator, 
Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell.28 
The coercion test in particular seemed to offer a wide field for 
government acknowledgement of the majority faith or faiths of a 
locality and for public prayer invoking majority religious language so 
long as no one was “coerced” to take part, whatever that might mean. 
This prospect became clear when the Court considered one of its first 
major Establishment Clause cases, Lee v. Weisman.29 The case was a 
challenge by a dissenting student and her parents to the practice of a 
Providence, Rhode Island, public school of inviting local clergy 
members to deliver religious, but “non-sectarian,” invocations and 
benedictions at middle- and high-school graduation ceremonies.30 
Under a traditional endorsement test, the practice of having an 
officially designated prayer would seem to be, at the very least, 
constitutionally shaky. But if coercion became the test, it could be 
argued that the official prayers were not even close to the 
Establishment Clause line. This was made clear by an exchange 
during oral argument in the case.31 Former assistant Attorney General 
Charles W. Cooper, Jr., representing the Providence school district, 
 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 25. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. For a good discussion of this test, see Jesse H. Choper, The 
Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 499 (2002). 
 26. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659–63. 
 27. 492 U.S. 573. 
 28. Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 933 (1986). 
 29. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 30. Id. at 580–81. 
 31. Transcript of Oral Argument, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014). 
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first stated that the Clause did not forbid the “non-sectarian” prayer at 
issue in the case, and suggested that it would not even bar a sectarian 
prayer containing references to specific deities.32 Justice O’Connor 
then asked whether the Clause would be violated if “a State 
legislature were to adopt a particular religion as the State religion, 
just like they might pass a resolution saying the bolo tie is the State 
necktie[,]” so long as the legislature added “[w]e’re not going to 
enforce it.”33 Cooper replied that it would be permissible “if it is 
purely noncoercive.”34 
Cooper’s answer produced a visible reaction from a number of the 
Justices, and may well have been the turning point in the case.35 
Regardless, the result in Lee was a major disappointment to religious 
conservative groups who had hoped that the Court would adopt a 
lenient “coercion” test for government speech acknowledging or 
endorsing religion. In a five-to-four decision, the Court struck down 
the practice as coercive because high-school students, even though 
formally allowed to receive their diplomas without attending the 
ceremony, were subject to peer pressure and other coercive forces 
sufficient to make them feel obligated to attend, stand, and bow their 
heads for the prayer, thereby suggesting assent.36 The opinion was 
written by Justice Kennedy, who had earlier been the apostle of the 
coercion test,37 and seemed to mark the end of that proposed test as a 
means of substantially altering the law of the Establishment Clause as 
it relates to public prayer in schools and elsewhere. A sophisticated, 
psychological view of coercion would limit many majority practices 
that might be permitted under a formalistic test that required legal 
penalty before a government practice crossed the Establishment 
Clause line. 
 
 32. Id. at 7–8. Cooper was later asked whether the United States could print “In Jesus 
Christ We Trust” on its coins, to which he replied: “I don’t think we would put that on the 
coins, but I think that is because, at this stage, that would not be politically possible . . . .” Id. at 
10. 
 33. Id. at 10–11; see also Linda Greenhouse, Court Appears Skeptical of Argument for 
Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at A22. 
 34. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 11. 
 35. Greenhouse, supra note 33. 
 36. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597–99. 
 37. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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The decision in Lee would repay much more detailed study, 
particularly given the importance of Justice Kennedy in the evolution 
of the Court’s cases regarding the Religion Clauses. What is most 
important for purposes of this essay is the remarkable dissent by 
Justice Scalia, who argued passionately that the prohibition of the 
graduation prayers was not simply wrong, but actively oppressive to 
certain religious believers. He noted: 
The reader has been told much in this case about the personal 
interest of Mr. Weisman and his daughter [the plaintiffs], and 
very little about the personal interests on the other side. They 
are not inconsequential. Church and state would not be such a 
difficult subject if religion were, as the Court apparently thinks 
it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be indulged 
entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one’s 
room. For most believers it is not that, and has never been. 
Religious men and women of almost all denominations have 
felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of 
God as a people, and not just as individuals, because they 
believe in the “protection of divine Providence,” as the 
Declaration of Independence put it, not just for individuals but 
for societies; because they believe God to be, as Washington’s 
first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it, the “Great Lord and 
Ruler of Nations.” 
The narrow context of the present case involves a community’s 
celebration of one of the milestones in its young citizens’ lives, 
and it is a bold step for this Court to seek to banish from that 
occasion, and from thousands of similar celebrations 
throughout this land, the expression of gratitude to God that a 
majority of the community wishes to make. The issue before 
us today is not the abstract philosophical question whether the 
alternative of frustrating this desire of a religious majority is to 
be preferred over the alternative of imposing “psychological 
coercion,” or a feeling of exclusion, upon nonbelievers. Rather, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the question is whether a mandatory choice in favor of the 
former has been imposed by the United States Constitution.38 
This was an important claim, one that would echo throughout the 
upcoming caselaw. It asserted that the religious rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution are not solely, or even primarily, individual 
rights, designed to protect the conscience against state imposition, but 
rather group rights that inhere specially in the majority of the 
members of a community who wish to order their public ceremonial 
life in a way that seems religiously appropriate to them. Under Justice 
Scalia’s analysis, the decision in Lee actively oppressed the 
(presumable) majority of high-school graduates and their families by 
denying them a central practice of their religion.39 Justice Scalia 
appeared to be implying that the decision denied religious believers, 
even though they were apparently the majority, their humanity and 
further stigmatized them. The refusal to allow them to use 
government occasions for prayer sends a message that their beliefs 
are shameful, like sexually explicit films.  
Such oppression, exclusion, and stigmatization are intolerable for 
any group, and even less tolerable when imposed, as Justice Scalia’s 
opinion suggests, on a majority by a tiny, elite minority. If that is so, 
then of course the next question to be faced by the oppressed majority 
is which alternative they would seek as remedy for their oppression: 
equality or transformation. 
III. THE WOODEN HORSE 
The first answer to this question was provided by Capitol Square 
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette.40 For the time being, the key 
demand was to be equality. Pinette concerned the request of a local 
Ku Klux Klan chapter to be allowed to place a large Latin cross 
honoring the Christmas season on the lawn of the Ohio State Capitol 
in Columbus.41 The lawn was the site of a few displays, including a 
state Christmas tree, a privately sponsored menorah, and the United 
 
 38. Lee, 505 U.S. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 41. Id. at 757–58. 
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Way “thermometer.”42 The state turned down the Klan’s request, 
however, on the stated ground that allowing its cross to appear 
temporarily on the lawn would create the impression that the state 
endorsed this sectarian religious symbol.43 
There was no disagreement that the lawn was a public forum, nor 
that the refusal to allow the cross constituted content-based 
discrimination. However, the state argued that the Establishment 
Clause gave it a compelling state interest in maintaining the 
discrimination.44 It placed particular emphasis on the fact that the 
property at issue controlled the entrance to the very headquarters of 
state government, thus making any mistaken attribution of state 
endorsement of the cross particularly troublesome for misled 
citizens.45 The Court gave short shrift to this interest; in essence, the 
opinion by Justice Scalia suggested that the Establishment Clause 
could never provide a reason to discriminate against religious speech, 
even when misperception of government endorsement was likely.46 
In addition, Justice Scalia made clear that equality between 
religious and non-religious expression always trumped Establishment 
concerns, forming a floor of protection below which religious 
expression could never fall. He noted that religion is truly special 
under the First Amendment—not subject to special restraints, but in 
every case a special favorite of the laws.47 The desire to protect 
against public misperception of government endorsement of private 
religious speech 
exiles private religious speech to a realm of less-protected 
expression heretofore inhabited only by sexually explicit 
displays and commercial speech. It will be a sad day when this 
Court casts piety in with pornography, and finds the First 
Amendment more hospitable to private expletives than to 
private prayers. This would be merely bizarre were religious 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 758–59. 
 44. Id. at 761–62. 
 45. Id. at 763. 
 46. Id. at 769 (“[T]he State may not, on the claim of misperception of official 
endorsement, ban all private religious speech from the public square, or discriminate against it 
by requiring religious speech alone to disclaim public sponsorship.”). 
 47. Id. at 767. 
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speech simply as protected by the Constitution as other forms 
of private speech; but it is outright perverse when one 
considers that private religious expression receives preferential 
treatment under the Free Exercise Clause.48 
Once again, the Court’s refusal to give special concern to religious 
speech would stigmatize it, and transform it into lesser-value speech, 
such as adult films. Equality would not be enough; religious speech 
was to be elevated to a realm that might be called “more than 
equality.” 
The consequences of preferential treatment became more clear a 
short while later in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,49 a case 
that used equality concepts to make a portentous change in the 
doctrine of the Establishment Clause. At issue in Rosenberger was 
whether the University of Virginia could maintain a rule denying 
student activity funds to publications that “primarily promote[d] or 
manifest[ed] a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate 
reality.”50 The publication at issue, Wide Awake, had as its mission 
“to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the 
faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a 
personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.”51 At the outset, it is 
important to characterize the University’s claim, which was that the 
desire not to violate the Establishment Clause constituted a 
“compelling interest” that allowed its admittedly content-based 
distinction between Wide Awake and The Daily Cavalier (a secular 
newspaper) in their eligibility for activity funds.52 In his dissent, 
Justice Souter characterized the issue as whether the Establishment 
Clause allowed “direct funding of core religious activities by an arm 
of the State.”53 That practice, Souter noted, had been regarded as 
impermissible throughout the evolution of the Court’s Establishment 
 
 48. Id. at 767–77 (citations omitted). 
 49. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 50. Id. at 822–23. 
 51. Id. at 826. 
 52. Id. at 837–38. The University backed away from this position when the case reached 
the Supreme Court, but because the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision on the 
point, the Court proceeded to address the issue. Id. 
 53. Id. at 863 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Clause jurisprudence.54 Indeed, Souter noted that it had been 
condemned by Madison himself in his Memorial and Remonstrance, 
which objected to Virginia’s proposed Clergy Assessment on a 
number of grounds, including that “the same authority which can 
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the 
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any 
other establishment in all cases whatsoever[.]”55 
Justice Souter’s point seems both clear and historically irrefutable. 
It does not, however, mean that the issue raised by Rosenberger was 
not a difficult one. Wide Awake and its Christian student editors were 
undoubtedly excluded from a fee program that allowed student 
groups not devoted to proselytization to participate. The University’s 
rule also required it to scrutinize the applications of all potential fee 
recipients, a practice that could give rise to both the potential for 
prior restraint on speech and the danger of entanglement of the 
University with religious organizations.56 
But what is striking about the majority opinion in Rosenberger is 
not that it held in favor of Wide Awake, but that in doing so it 
pronounced that the issue raised by Justice Souter was really not very 
important. There was no question, either between the majority and 
the dissenters or between the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit 
panel that had upheld the University rule,57 that the distinction was 
content-based (though one might differ whether the basis was, as the 
majority insisted, Wide Awake’s viewpoint or its subject matter).58 
The sole question involved the weight to be given to the 
Establishment Clause and its hitherto perspicuous bar on direct state 
financial aid to the propagation of religious faith. The majority found 
that the Establishment Clause interest was simply not present in these 
cases because the program was “neutral” toward religion, rather than 
being “a tax levied for the direct support of a church or group of 
 
 54. Id. at 873–76. 
 55. Id. at 868 (citations omitted). 
 56. That means “entanglement” under its old meaning of, well, entanglement, see Aguilar 
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985), rather than its newspeak meaning of primary effect, see 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–35 (1997). 
 57. 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 58. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“We conclude, nonetheless, that here . . . viewpoint 
discrimination is the proper way to interpret the University’s objections to Wide Awake.”). 
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churches.”59 In addition, the Establishment Clause was not violated 
because the University funds that flowed to the printer of Wide 
Awake did not pass through the editors’ hands, but rather came 
straight from the University, and because the money came from a 
mandatory activity fee paid by each student rather than “a general tax 
designed to raise revenue for the University.”60 For those reasons, the 
subsidy program was “a far cry from a general public assessment 
designed and effected to provide financial support for a church.”61 
The Establishment Clause thus turned out to be far less serious an 
obstacle than the dissent perceived it to be. Implicitly, it formed a bar 
only to programs using general taxation to create programs that 
benefit either specific religions or all religions, but not non-religious 
groups. For this reason, the admitted content discrimination in the fee 
program could not be justified, and Wide Awake received its funding. 
This was a result grounded in a demand for equality, or, as the 
majority phrased it, “neutrality.”62 But the transformative demand is 
also lurking in this case, couched in Justice Thomas’ concurrence.63 
For Justice Thomas, the correct interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause would not pose any barrier to the direct award of general tax 
funds to a religious organization; indeed, the Virginia Assessment 
that outraged Madison would have been fine, Justice Thomas wrote, 
if it had only been “a truly neutral program that would benefit 
religious adherents as part of a large class of beneficiaries defined 
without reference to religion.”64 Analyzing the sparse legislative 
record of the First Amendment, Justice Thomas concluded that 
“Madison saw the principle of nonestablishment as barring 
governmental preferences for particular religious faiths.”65 Justice 
Thomas admitted that not every analysis of Madison’s thought would 
 
 59. Id. at 840. 
 60. Id. at 840–41. 
 61. Id. at 841. 
 62. Id. at 837–46. That the two terms are not always synonymous any second child can 
tell us. 
 63. Id. at 852 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 853 n.1. Justice Thomas reviewed the historical debates surrounding the 
Virginia “Assessment Controversy,” and concluded that the bill violated the equality principle 
“not because it allowed religious groups to participate in a generally available government 
program, but because the bill singled out religious entities for special benefits.” Id. at 854–55. 
 65. Id. at 856. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/13
p323 Epps book pages.DOC  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  Some Animals Are More Equal 337 
 
 
support this narrow reading; indeed, Madison himself seemed to 
contradict it both in the Remonstrance and in his other works.66 But 
what did he know and who really cares what he said? 
[E]ven if more extreme notions of the separation of church and 
state can be attributed to Madison, many of them clearly stem 
from “arguments reflecting the concepts of natural law, natural 
rights, and the social contract between government and a civil 
society,” rather than the principle of nonestablishment in the 
Constitution. In any event, the views of one man do not 
establish the original understanding of the First Amendment.67 
Rosenberger arguably reached a revolutionary result: when 
religion demands equal treatment, the special protections placed 
around it in the Constitution itself are to be given relatively little 
weight. When a religious activity can be characterized as speech (as 
opposed to, say, ingesting peyote), it must be protected exactly as 
non-religious speech is, and indeed it is entitled to subsidy if any 
non-religious speech receives government funds. This result is key to 
the revolution thus far, but the concurrence directs our attention to an 
even more radical position. Under the new disposition, James 
Madison, author of the Remonstrance and principal sponsor of the 
First Amendment, is to be regarded as an extremist. 
Mitchell v. Helms68 advanced the program yet another giant step. 
Remember that Rosenberger allowed state money to flow for a 
religious publication because (1) it was not tax money, and (2) it was 
not paid to the organization and thus could not be diverted from the 
intended purpose.69 Under the new doctrine enunciated by four 
Justices in Mitchell, however, equality demands that government aid 
in a “neutral program” must flow to religious organizations, even if 
funded from general tax revenues70 and even if the program contains 
no safeguards to protect against their direct use by the religious 
organization.71 
 
 66. Id. at 854–58. 
 67. Id. at 856 (citation omitted). 
 68. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 69. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841. 
 70. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 816. 
 71. Id. at 832–35. 
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At issue in Mitchell was a federally funded program that loaned 
educational materials, such as library books, computers and software, 
and audio-visual materials, to qualifying schools, both public and 
private.72 The materials themselves were required to be “secular, 
neutral and nonideological.”73 The Fifth Circuit, though admitting 
that cases such as Rosenberger had scrambled the law of aid to 
religious organizations, held that provision of these materials to 
Catholic schools in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, violated the 
Establishment Clause.74 The Supreme Court reversed this ruling and 
reinstated the program.75 Though the Court could not produce a 
majority for any opinion explaining the result, Justice Thomas 
authored an opinion for himself and three others.76 Justice Thomas 
found that the aid at issue flowed to religious schools as a result of 
“private choices,” even though the aid itself went directly from 
government to the schools.77 This meant the program was neutral, 
and thus not a violation of the Clause.78 The distinction between 
direct and indirect aid, he wrote, was no longer important.79 This case 
did not concern “direct payments of money,” and so it did not cross 
the Establishment Clause line.80 
Justice Thomas conceded that the materials might be diverted 
from their intended secular use—but so what? There was no longer a 
rule against divertible aid; the only rule was that aid must be provided 
by neutral criteria.81 What happens to it after that was simply no 
longer an issue. “[A]ny use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be 
attributed to the government and is thus not of constitutional 
concern,” he explained, so long as the content of the aid itself is not 
religious and eligibility for such aid is determined in a 
 
 72. Id. at 801–02. 
 73. Id. at 802 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1) (2000)). 
 74. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 75. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836. 
 76. Id. at 801–36. Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Kennedy and Scalia. Id. at 801. 
 77. Id. at 831 (“Because Chapter 2 aid is provided pursuant to private choices, it is not 
problematic that one could fairly describe Chapter 2 as providing ‘direct’ aid.”). 
 78. Id. at 829. 
 79. Id. at 818 (“Whether one chooses to label this program ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ is a rather 
arbitrary choice, one that does not further the constitutional analysis.”). 
 80. Id. at 819–20. 
 81. Id. at 820. 
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constitutionally permissible manner.82 This is true even when the 
recipient school is “pervasively sectarian,”83 meaning, in essence, 
that it teaches every subject and conducts every school activity from 
a religious point of view. Although the concept of pervasive 
sectarianism was used by the Court to strike down an aid program as 
recently as 1985,84 Justice Thomas demanded its demise as a 
constitutional concept. His demand was based in history and 
grounded in the demand for equality. He noted: 
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a 
shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow. . . . 
Opposition to aid to “sectarian” schools acquired prominence 
in the 1870’s with Congress’s consideration (and near passage) 
of the Blaine Amendment, which would have amended the 
Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian institutions. 
Consideration of the amendment arose at a time of pervasive 
hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, 
and it was an open secret that “sectarian” was code for 
“Catholic.” Notwithstanding its history, of course, “sectarian” 
could, on its face, describe the school of any religious sect, but 
the Court eliminated this possibility of confusion when, in 
Hunt v. McNair, . . . it coined the term “pervasively 
sectarian”—a term which, at that time, could be applied almost 
exclusively to Catholic parochial schools and which even 
today’s dissent exemplifies chiefly by reference to such 
schools. 
In short, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the 
exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise 
permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of this Court bar 
it. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.85 
This passage sounded the trumpet in a way that leaders of the 
Civil Rights Movement did during the 1960s. Any governmental 
distinction with a history of oppressive content is now to be regarded 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 826. 
 84. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
 85. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828–29. 
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as illegitimate, even if neutrally applicable. It is hard to be 
unsympathetic with that demand. It is the kind of contextual 
sophistication missing from decisions such as Washington v. Davis86 
and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson.87 But the historical 
sophistication did not mark a permanent change in the discourse of 
the conservative majority of the Court. It stands in marked contrast to 
the bland unconcern of Chief Justice Rehnquist shortly afterwards in 
his opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.88 Zelman finally breached 
the Establishment walls that had allegedly been important in 
approving the earlier payments of state funds to religious 
organizations.  
Zelman concerned a voucher program by which general tax funds 
were paid directly to religious schools in the form of tuition vouchers 
signed over to the schools by parents of children escaping 
Cleveland’s failing public education system.89 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote that there was no Establishment Clause violation 
because the vouchers were paid as part of a “neutral” program of 
“true private choice.”90 The fact that ninety-six percent of the 
vouchers went to religious schools was hardly worth mentioning;91 
context no longer seemed to matter. “The constitutionality of a 
neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and 
why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are 
run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the 
aid at a religious school.”92 After all, many students did not use the 
vouchers at all, choosing instead to attend public schools.93 In 
essence, the history of controversy regarding tuition payments to 
religious schools was not only irrelevant, but almost nonexistent; 
ninety-six percent was close enough for government work.  
 
 86. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 87. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 88. 536 U.S. 639, 643–63 (2002). 
 89. Id. at 644–48. 
 90. Id. at 662–63. 
 91. Id. at 658. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 655. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion announced that, with the aid of 
neutrality/equality, a key objective had been reached. What would be 
the next redoubt, and how would it be stormed? 
IV. THE SOUND OF HIS WINGS 
Perhaps a portent of the answer can be found in Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in McCreary County v. ACLU,94 decided at the end of the 
Court’s last term. In McCreary, a five-justice majority held that two 
Kentucky counties violated the Establishment Clause by adorning 
their courthouses with large displays of the Ten Commandments 
surrounded by other historical documents purporting to demonstrate 
that the American legal system flows from Biblical values.95 Using 
the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, the majority held that the display in 
context lacked a secular purpose, and thus could not stand.96 
Because the fifth vote in McCreary was Justice O’Connor’s, her 
retirement may mean that this case will be the last victory for 
anything approaching separationism, and that the Roberts Court will 
begin from the forward position secured by the Rehnquist Court and 
move the church-state line even more radically in the pro-religion 
direction. If so, Justice Scalia’s ferocious dissent in McCreary may 
set forth the new plan of attack.97 Justice Scalia announced that, 
having secured equal access to the public fisc, religious conservatives 
should not be satisfied with equality any longer. A proper end of 
repression demanded not only preferential treatment for all religious 
speech, but also a key governmental role for certain religious beliefs 
designated as “traditional” or “majority” beliefs.98 Justice Scalia 
suggested that the posting of a Ten Commandments display is 
permissible not on a principle of neutrality or even “neutrality-plus” 
for religious speech generally, but because the Ten Commandments 
are part of the majority religion that the Establishment Clause, in 
spite of its seemingly prohibitory language, tacitly establishes. He 
noted: 
 
 94. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
 95. Id. at 2732 (affirming the Sixth Circuit’s opinion). 
 96. Id. at 2732–45. 
 97. Id. at 2748–64 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 2752–53. 
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If religion in the public forum had to be entirely 
nondenominational, there could be no religion in the public 
forum at all. One cannot say the word “God,” or “the 
Almighty,” one cannot offer public supplication or 
thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of people that 
there are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no attention 
to human affairs. With respect to public acknowledgment of 
religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Nation’s historical 
practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard 
of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it 
permits the disregard of devout atheists. . . . The three most 
popular religions in the United States, Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam—which combined account for 97.7% of all 
believers—are monotheistic. All of them, moreover (Islam 
included), believe that the Ten Commandments were given by 
God to Moses, and are divine prescriptions for a virtuous life. 
Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is thus 
indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other 
religions is concerned, from publicly honoring God. Both 
practices are recognized across such a broad and diverse range 
of the population—from Christians to Muslims—that they 
cannot be reasonably understood as a government endorsement 
of a particular religious viewpoint.99 
This is an extraordinary claim. It suggests that the government 
may disregard the religious beliefs of its citizens who do not share the 
majority belief system. Note that the permitted disregard extends not 
only to exotic polytheists, but also to those who believe in a god who 
“pay[s] no attention to human affairs,”100 in other words, to the 
successors of the eighteenth-century Deists who contributed both to 
the American Revolution and to the content of the Religion Clauses; 
outnumbered in the 2004 census figures, they simply no longer count. 
Once the idea of constitutionalized disregard is admitted to the 
discourse, a limiting principle seems elusive. The very statistical 
source that Justice Scalia relies on also suggests that nearly seventy-
 
 99. Id. (citations omitted). 
 100. Id. at 2753. 
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seven percent of the U.S. population is Christian.101 Many historical 
revisionists now strongly press the claim that our Constitution and the 
nation it defines are in fact specifically Protestant Christian 
constructs, owing little or nothing to any other religious faith.102 
What limiting principle would prevent a future Justice Scalia from 
finding no Establishment violation in the Beatitudes or in John 3:16? 
As the animal revolution moved into its final phase, the sheep in 
Animal Farm were eventually trained to bleat, “Four legs good two 
legs better.”103 Can the time be far away when we will hear the claim, 
“One God good, three Gods in One better?” And how far will we be 
then from the precise kind of establishment that the old extremist, 
James Madison, sought to forestall? 
In the guise of a proper understanding of the past, Justice Scalia, 
the prophet of Lee v. Weisman, now points us toward a somewhat 
ominous future.  
V. THE RETURN OF THE PAST 
“I know, and all the world knows,” said William H. Seward in his 
prophetic “Irrepressible Conflict” speech, “that revolutions never go 
backwards.”104 Certainly, victorious revolutionaries seldom moderate 
their demands or their faith in the rightness of their cause. The 
Rehnquist Court moved the law of church and state an enormous 
distance; with the introduction of Chief Justice Roberts, it is hard to 
imagine that the appetite of the religious conservative movement will 
be slaked. Justice Scalia has proclaimed the objective of removing 
“majority” religion from the strictures of the Establishment Clause. 
How might this be done? 
 
 101. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004–2005, 
at  55 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract.html. 
 102. See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
RELIGION (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution intended political 
influence and office to be wielded only by Protestants, excluding not only atheists and Deists, 
but also Catholics and “Hebrews”). Barton might be regarded as a crackpot, but he in fact 
played a prominent role in the 2004 Bush-Cheney campaign, which paid his way to speak to 
Christian groups around the country on the “proper” role of religion under the Constitution.  
 103. ORWELL, supra note 9, at 93. 
 104. William Henry Seward, Speech Delivered at Rochester, N.Y.: On The Irrepressible 
Conflict (Oct. 25, 1858), available at htpp://www.nyhistory.com/central/conflict.htm. 
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One possible route is suggested by a recent article by Professor 
Noah Feldman of New York University.105 How can we solve the 
tension between religious conservatives, who seek to enshrine their 
religion in law, and secularists, who believe that the kind of 
acknowledgement Justice Scalia proclaimed to be legitimate will in 
fact exclude and stigmatize those who do not share the official 
monotheism? Professor Feldman offers a comprehensive solution: 
“Put simply, it is this: offer greater latitude for religious speech and 
symbols in public debate, but also impose a stricter ban on state 
financing of religious institutions and activities.”106 Moments of 
silence in public schools, public prayer at Friday night football 
games, public-school courses in “intelligent design,” and privately 
funded religious monuments on courthouse greens would be 
permitted under the Establishment Clause; the kind of subsidies now 
legitimized by Mitchell and Zellman might not. 
Obviously, this solution would not satisfy those who believe that 
governmental invocation of the Judeo-Christian God excludes and 
stigmatizes them. Professor Feldman offers this counsel: 
Take the fact that the government treats Christmas as a 
national holiday. It would be absurd if Jews or Muslims or 
Hindus or Buddhists felt fundamentally excluded from 
citizenship by this fact—and I would venture to suggest that 
very few do. . . . Some members of religious minorities may 
choose to spend December feeling bad that they are not part of 
the majority culture—but they would have this same problem 
even if Christmas were not a national holiday, since Christmas 
would still be all around them. The answer is for them to 
strengthen their own identities and be proud of who they are, 
 
 105. Noah Feldman, A Church-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, available at 2005 
WLNR 10446246. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Feldman is somehow in league with 
Justice Scalia, or that his suggestions are part of a Scalian program. There is a difference 
between a revolution and a conspiracy. In the former, each victory fuels a new demand, often 
unforeseen by anyone involved beforehand. The typical response from the non-revolutionary 
side is a kind of temporizing, a disposition to compromise, to give up some ground hitherto 
thought sacrosanct in order to defend other territory. Every revolution has its Kerensky, its 
Bani-Sadr; and their efforts at compromise are usually not made more effective by the simple 
fact that they are sincerely meant. 
 106. Id. 
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not to insist that the majority give up its own celebration to 
accommodate them.107 
This “solution” is offered in good faith and with good will. But I 
must respectfully suggest that there are several things wrong with it. 
First, am I the only one to hear in the admonition to minorities that 
they should “strengthen their own identities and be proud of who they 
are” an unintentional echo of some famous words from a now 
overruled case? In 1896, a majority of the Court responded to another 
claim of exclusion and stigmatization by noting: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument 
to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the 
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If 
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but 
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.108 
Whatever may have been the case in 1896, today we know that 
recognizing human inequality under law rarely strengthens those 
denoted as less worthy of concern than the majority; instead, the 
opposite is more often true. Designating winners and losers in this 
way usually whets the appetites of winners for more superiority and 
privilege; this is the second flaw in Professor Feldman’s proposed 
solution. Revolutions do not go backwards. If the “majority” agrees 
to such a “compromise,” as Feldman proposes, history suggests that 
there is little reason to believe that the “compromise” will hold.  
I recently completed a lengthy study of the years before and after 
the Civil War.109 One of the most striking events in that period was 
the rapid abandonment by the South and its allies of the famous 
Compromise of 1850. At a time when “compromising” promised to 
win the South what it wanted—a vastly strengthened Fugitive Slave 
Law,—its leaders solemnly intoned that the Missouri Compromise 
 
 107. Feldman, supra note 105. 
 108. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 109. By “lengthy study,” I mean “a long period devoted to study.” However, given the 
opportunity, I will cite the fruits of that “lengthy study.” GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR 
AMERICA (2006). 
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line (slavery permitted to the South and prohibited to the North) was 
part of a covenant secured by the region’s word of honor.110 Scarcely 
four years later, sensing an opening, the South repudiated the 
compromise and demanded “popular sovereignty” in Kansas (well 
north of the “compromise” line) so that slave-owners could take their 
chattels there and set up a slave system.111 It is not unreasonable to 
surmise that the winners in Professor Feldman’s “compromise” will 
take the real advantage they gain under the Establishment Clause and 
use it to bolster their case for subsidy and public acknowledgement. 
The third problem with Feldman’s solution is the idea that a core 
constitutional issue such as the Establishment Clause can be treated 
as a bipolar dispute between warring parties to be “settled” by 
dividing the First Amendment up like the West Bank of the Jordan. 
All of us have a stake in the Constitution, whether we are “values 
evangelicals” or “secularists” (to use Professor Feldman’s terms), or 
whether we simply do not adhere to either of his two positions. It is 
not the job of judges to sit down and dole out the territory. Instead, 
constitutional adjudication is (in some admittedly hard-to-define 
way) supposed to emanate from the text, history, structure, values 
and caselaw originating in the document itself. Sometimes that means 
denying even half a loaf to majorities.112 Nowhere does that seem 
more salient than in the area of the Establishment Clause, which, at 
its conception no less than today, emanates precisely from a desire to 
limit the extent to which majorities may impose their preferred 
religious identities on minorities. As we look back on the religious ill 
will generated by the election of 2004, we should surely conclude 
that a sea-change in the Establishment Clause and a new 
empowerment of the majority bodes ill for the civic peace. The 
potential radicalism of the latest prophecy is so sweeping that one is 
moved to sympathize with Justice O’Connor, who wrote her 
valedictory in McCreary to emphasize her concern over the way 
things were moving in the church-state area: “Those who would 
renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must therefore 
 
 110. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE-CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 70–77, 
117–18 (1988). 
 111. Id. at 121–23. 
 112. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has 
served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?”113 
 
 113. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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